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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
No. 11-2258 
 
________________ 
ERASMO ANIBAL MARTINEZ, 
 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 
         
       Respondent 
 
________________ 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret Reichenberg 
(No. A042-439-642) 
_______________ 
 
Argued April 11, 2012 
 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, 
and JONES, II,
Circuit Judge 
* 
 
District Judge 
(Opinion filed: September 6, 2012) 
                                              
* Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge for the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
sitting by designation. 
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____________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
____________ 
 
JONES, II, District Judge. 
 Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) expressly bars from status adjustment a non-citizen 
who has “previously been admitted to the United States as an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” but later is 
convicted of an aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. § 82(h)(1)(C)(2).  
This appeal presents a question of first impression in this 
Circuit: whether someone who was accorded the designation 
of “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” status upon 
physical entry into the United States, but who in fact did not 
substantively qualify for such designated status, is still barred 
from Section 212(h) relief.  We determine that “admission” as 
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an lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) in Section 212(h) 
refers to a procedurally regular entry, not a substantively 
compliant one.  As we conclude here that the prohibition 
holds, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
I. Background 
 
Petitioner Erasmo Anibal Martinez, a native of 
Nicaragua, entered the United States without inspection in 
1985.  In October 1989, he married a United States citizen 
(who bore his daughter later that year), and began the process 
of adjusting his status to LPR.  On September 15, 1990, 
Martinez was arrested and later charged in a four-count 
indictment before the Superior Court of New Jersey.  On 
December 7, 1990, he pleaded guilty to sexual assault under 
N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-2b, admitting that he had touched the 
vaginal area of his then-eight-year-old step-daughter. 
 
In early 1991, after his plea but prior to his sentencing, 
Martinez travelled to Nicaragua to complete the immigrant 
visa application process.  The United States consulate in 
Nicaragua approved his application on March 5, 1991.  
Martinez was admitted to the United States as a permanent 
resident the following day.  On March 22, 1991, two weeks 
after he obtained permanent resident status, he was sentenced 
to four years in prison.  Martinez was released on parole on 
November 9, 1992.   
 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
initiated removal proceedings against Martinez in August 
2009, and Martinez ultimately conceded that he was 
removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony 
for sexual abuse of a minor.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (setting forth grounds for removability), 
1101(a)(43)(A) (defining aggravated felony).  Martinez 
argued, however, that he was eligible for adjustment of status 
under former INA Section 212(c), which waived the bar 
against status adjustment for convicted aggravated felons in 
the case of certain LPRs.1
                                              
1 Waiver under former Section 212(c) required that an alien 
have (1) at least seven years unrelinquished residence in the 
United States; (2) at least five years as an LPR; and (3) not 
  DHS responded that Martinez was 
4 
 
not eligible for a Section 212(c) waiver because he had not in 
fact been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” (an 
eligibility requirement under Section 212(c)): he had failed to 
disclose his prior arrest and guilty plea on his original 
application for permanent resident status.  The Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”) agreed.   
 
In response, Martinez sought instead to readjust his 
status under INA Section 212(h)(1)(A), which allows for 
adjustment of alien status by the spouse, parent, son or 
daughter of a United States citizen where denial of such 
adjustment would constitute extreme hardship on either the 
alien or the citizen.  Section 212(h), however, expressly bars 
from relief a non-citizen who has “previously been admitted 
to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence” but “since the date of admission . . . has 
been convicted of an aggravated felony . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 
1182(h)(1)(C)(2).  With some creativity, Martinez argued that 
this bar could not apply to him because he was actually 
inadmissible at the time he was granted LPR status due to his 
failure to disclose his prior arrest and guilty plea at the time 
he entered the United States as an LPR.2
                                                                                                     
served more than five years in prison after final conviction for 
an offense. 
 
2 As the Board of Immigration Appeals points out, Martinez’s 
conviction did not render him deportable under Section 
237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 
because the offense resulting in the conviction was committed 
before, rather than after, Martinez began adjusting his status 
in the United States.  Appendix for Petitioner (“Pet. App.”) 7a 
(citing Matter of Alyazji, 25 I & N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011)).  At 
the very least, however, it was Martinez’s failure to disclose 
his arrest and guilty plea that rendered him inadmissible at the 
time he entered, because of “‘fraud or willfully 
misrepresenting a material fact.’”  Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 
F.3d 1092, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (record did not establish 
aggravated felony conviction but did establish arrest for said 
felony) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)); see Mwongera 
v. I.N.S., 187 F.3d 323, 330 (3d Cir. 1999) (“knowledge of the 
falsity of the representation will suffice” to establish 
inadmissibility).  As the Board notes, Martinez conceded 
before the IJ that his conviction involved a crime of moral 
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The IJ rejected Martinez’s argument.  While 
substantive satisfaction of LPR status was an underlying 
requirement for Section 212(c) waiver, the IJ found that the 
absence of such satisfaction did not equate to waiver of the 
Section 212(h) bar.  Specifically, the IJ held that the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision in In re Ayala-
Arevalo, 22 I & N Dec. 398 (BIA 1998), controlled and 
Martinez was statutorily ineligible for Section 212(h) relief. 
 
Martinez timely appealed to the BIA, arguing that he 
was eligible for Section 212(c) relief because the IJ erred in 
concluding that Martinez had never been “lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence.”  In the alternative, Martinez 
contended that if the BIA determined that he had never been 
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” then it should 
find him eligible for a Section 212(h) waiver, thus overruling 
Ayala.   
 
The BIA remained similarly unpersuaded.  According 
to the Board, Martinez was ineligible for 212(c) relief 
because he had “never been lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence,” but he was also ineligible for 212(h) relief: 
“although [Martinez] has never been lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence” in a substantive manner, he had 
“previously been ‘admitted,’ even if that admission has 
subsequently been ‘determined to have been . . . in violation 
of law.’”  Pet. App. 8a (quoting Ayala at 401 (ellipsis in the 
original)).   The Board concluded that Ayala compelled a 
finding that Martinez’s aggravated felony conviction rendered 
him ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under Section 
212(h), and the BIA declined to overturn Ayala.   
 
Martinez then timely filed a petition for review of the 
Section 212(h) waiver question only, and later moved for a 
                                                                                                     
turpitude; the IJ determined that such acknowledgement 
rendered him inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (any alien “convicted of, or who admits 
having committed . . . a crime involving moral turpitude . . . is 
inadmissible.”).  Pet. App. 7a & n.2.   
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stay of removal, which was granted.3
 
  The Newark 
Immigration Court had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.14(a) and the BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1003.1(b)(3).  As Martinez seeks review of a final order of 
removal, this Court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
II. Standard of Review 
 
When, as here, the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision and 
adds analysis of its own, we review both the IJ’s and the 
BIA’s decisions.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 243 (3d Cir. 
2003) (en banc); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  We review de novo questions of law, such as the 
proper construction of Section 212(h).  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 
488 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2007).  Using all “traditional tools 
of statutory construction,” we must determine “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”  
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9 (1984). “If Congress has done so, 
[our] inquiry is at an end; [we] ‘must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”  FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 
(2000) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).  If, however, the 
statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue,” we must assess “whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  If 
so, then we must defer to that construction.  Id. at 845. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Respondent urges us to apply Chevron 
deference here.  Martinez, however, argues on two grounds 
that Chevron does not apply.  First, Martinez claims that no 
statutory ambiguity exists, such that Congress clearly 
intended for the Section 212(h) waiver to apply to an 
individual like Martinez.  Second, Martinez claims that even 
if such ambiguity does exist, it is for this Court to resolve 
without deference to the BIA’s statutory construction, which 
would be due only if the BIA itself had interpreted Section 
212(h).  According to Martinez, in Ayala the BIA explicitly 
                                              
3 While the BIA addressed Martinez’s ineligibility for several 
different waivers of inadmissibility for which Martinez had 
applied, here Martinez appeals only the Section 212(h) waiver 
issue.   
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found that Section 212(h) “clearly precluded” waiver 
applicants such as himself; thus the BIA did not reach its own 
construction of the statute, and therefore this Court should not 
defer to the BIA’s application of Section 212(h).   
 
Martinez cites exclusively to caselaw from the D.C. 
Circuit and the Seventh Circuit in support of his argument 
against Chevron deference.  See Reply Brief for Petitioner 
(“Pet. Reply”) at 7-8 (citing Arizona v. Thompson, 281 F.3d 
248, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. 
Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 
2006); Escobar Barraza v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 388, 391 (7th 
Cir. 2008); U.S. Postal Service v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 
640 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).  The Third Circuit has 
not yet addressed the question of whether such deference is 
“only appropriate when the agency has exercised its own 
judgment, not when it believes that [its] interpretation is 
compelled by Congress.”  Thompson, 281 F.3d at 254 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original).4
                                              
4 While not necessarily reaching the same ultimate 
conclusions, the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
have declined to accord explicit Chevron deference under 
similar circumstances.  See Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 
380, 386 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he BIA’s interpretation of 
Section 212(h) in the instant case fails the first prong of the 
Chevron test…the statutory bar to a waiver of inadmissibility 
is not ambiguous with respect to whom it applies.”); Martinez 
v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[F]or the § 
212(h) bar to apply: when the alien is granted permission, 
after inspection, to enter the United States, he must then be 
admitted as [a lawful permanent resident]. Accordingly, we 
find no basis for the statutory language's being ambiguous.”); 
Hing Sum, 602 F.3d at 1099 (“We need not resort to 
legislative history because the statute is not ambiguous.”); 
Lanier v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 
2011); (Based on [Section 212(h)’s] unambiguous text, we 
find that the statutory bar to relief does not apply to those 
persons who . . . adjusted to lawful permanent resident status 
while already living in the United States.”). 
  For the reasons set forth below, however, we find 
Section 212(h)’s statutory language free of ambiguity—
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though not in the manner Martinez champions—and thus we 
need not accord Chevron deference.  
 
III. Analysis 
A. Statutory Language 
 
Section 212(h) provides one of the few avenues of 
relief for non-citizens who would otherwise be eligible to 
adjust their immigration status but for certain grounds of 
inadmissibility, such as moral turpitude.  In 1996, however, as 
part of a larger immigration reform initiative, Congress 
amended the statute to render fewer LPRs eligible for the 
Section 212(h) waiver on aggravated felonies.  See Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §348, 110 
Stat. 3009 (amending 8 U.S.C. §1182(h)).  The statute 
currently provides that “[n]o waiver shall be granted under 
this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously 
been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence if . . . since the date of such 
admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated 
felony . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(C)(2).5
                                              
5 Prior to the 1996 amendment, the INA assessed status on the 
basis of “entry” as opposed to “admission.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13) (1994) (defining “entry” as “any coming of an 
alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or 
from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or 
otherwise”).  Non-citizens who had “entered” the United 
States were processed for deportation; those who had not 
“entered” were sent into exclusion proceedings.  Charles 
Gordon, Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, 1-1 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.03(2)(b) (2010).  As 
a result, “non-citizens who had entered without inspection 
could take advantage of the greater procedural and 
substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings,” while 
non-citizens who actually presented themselves to authorities 
for inspection were restrained by “more summary exclusion 
proceedings.”  Hing Sum, 602 F. 3d at 1100.  To remedy this 
unintended and undesirable consequence, the IIRIRA 
substituted “admission” for “entry,” and replaced deportation 
and exclusion proceedings with the more general “removal” 
proceeding. 
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Thus, as our sister court in the Ninth Circuit has 
explained so succinctly, Section 212(h) waivers are “available 
to non-LPRs convicted of aggravated felonies, or non-citizens 
who were convicted of an aggravated felony prior to their 
admission as LPRs, but they are unavailable to non-citizens 
who were convicted of an aggravated felony after their 
admission as LPRs.”  Hing Sum, 602 F.3d at 1095 (emphasis 
in original) (citing In re Michel, 21 I & N Dec. 1101, 1104 
(BIA 1998) (en banc) and United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 
1076, 1080-81 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)).  As outlined above, 
Martinez’s appeal rests on whether, despite his arrest and 
guilty plea prior to adjusting to LPR status, he is eligible to 
seek Section 212(h) relief.  As the BIA opinion notes, the IJ 
found that Martinez was “previously admitted . . . as an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence” within the 
meaning of Section 212(h), that he was subsequently 
convicted for an aggravated felony, and that he was therefore 
barred from pursuing Section 212(h) relief.  Pet. App. 116a.6
                                              
6 Since the INA’s 1996 amendment, the term “conviction” 
means: 
  
Martinez contends, however, that precisely because he 
 with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of 
the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt 
has been withheld, where (i) a judge or jury has found 
the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has 
ordered some form of punishment, penalty or restraint 
on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.  
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (emphasis added).  Martinez 
pleaded guilty on December 7, 1990 but was not sentenced 
until March 22, 1991—two weeks after his relevant entry into 
the United States on March 6, 1991.  Accordingly, as the BIA 
found, he was not “convicted” of an aggravated felony until 
after his admission.  See Pet. App. 6a (citing Perez v. Elwood, 
294 F.3d 552, 562 (3d Cir. 2002) (alien’s “conviction” 
occurred not when he was tried and found guilty by jury but 
on date sentence was imposed))).  In any event, Martinez 
does not contest that he was “convicted” subsequent to his 
March 1991 admission, despite tendering his guilty plea prior 
to his admission, and thus waives any potential argument on 
that ground. 
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attained LPR status through fraud or misrepresentation, he 
was never lawfully admitted and thus Section 212(h) cannot 
bar his status adjustment now. 
 
B. Application 
 
The INA defines “admitted” as the “lawful entry of the 
alien into the United States after inspection and 
authorization by an immigration officer,” 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13)(A)—in other words, a procedurally 
regular admission into the United States, not 
necessarily a substantively lawful one.  The term 
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” in turn, 
is defined as “the status of having been lawfully 
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the 
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the 
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).   
 
Thus, an alien permitted to enter the United States by 
an immigration officer has been “admitted” even if he did not 
meet the substantive legal requirements for admission at that 
time, although he was not “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence” under the INA unless he were substantively in 
compliance with those admission requirements.  See Emokah 
v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2008) (admission 
obtained by using fraudulent visa still constitutes 
“admission”); Borrego v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 689, 691-93 
(same); compare to Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I & N Dec. 
548, 551-52 (BIA 2003) (LPR who obtained status by 
fraudulent marriage to United States citizen was not “lawfully 
admitted”).   
 
The Third Circuit has previously deferred to the BIA’s 
interpretation that “an alien whose status has been adjusted to 
lawful permanent resident but who is subsequently 
determined in an immigration proceeding to have originally 
been ineligible for that status has not been ‘lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence,’” and that such individuals are 
therefore ineligible for waivers of inadmissibility.  Gallimore 
v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 216, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, 
Gallimore concerned interpretation of former Section 212(c) 
of the INA.  Like Section 212(h), Section 212(c) employed 
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the phrase “lawful permanent resident,” but without the 
crucial modifying language of “previously been admitted . . . 
as.”  See De La Rosa v. DHS, 489 F.3d 551, 554-55 (2d Cir. 
2007); Savoury v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th 
Cir. 2006); Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 
1187 (8th Cir. 2005); Monet v. INS, 791 F.2d 752, 753-55 
(9th Cir. 1986); Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441-42 
(5th Cir. 1983).  Along the same lines, other circuits have 
isolated Section 212(c)’s “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence” from the preceding language “previously been 
admitted,” but those cases did not involve interpreting the 
fully expanded modifier: “previously been admitted…as” 
(emphasis added).  See Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 388; Lanier 
v. Att’y Gen., 631 F.3d at 1366; Martinez, 519 F.3d at 546.  In 
other words, the Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits focused 
on the word “lawfully” in defining “admission.”  We, on the 
other hand, agree with the Ninth Circuit that the controlling 
phrase here is not “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence,” but rather the preceding phrase, “previously been 
admitted to the United States . . . as.”  Hing Sum, 602 F.3d 
1092, 1097 (distinguishing Martinez).7
 
 
Only one federal appellate court has confronted 
precisely the same issue that Martinez now raises.  In Hing 
Sum, the petitioner was arrested and allegedly convicted for a 
state law violation three years before being admitted to the 
United States as an LPR.  Ten years after his admission, he 
was convicted on federal counterfeiting conspiracy charges, 
and the government commenced removal proceedings based 
on this latter conviction.  Like Martinez, Sum sought a waiver 
under Section 212(h), “arguing that he was not subject to the 
bar on § 212(h) relief because he was actually inadmissible at 
the time he obtained LPR status either because of his 1987 
conviction or because of his failure to disclose that conviction 
when he entered as an LPR in 1990.”  Id. at 1094 (footnote 
omitted).   
                                              
7 Bracamontes, Lanier, and Martinez are further 
distinguishable from the instant case in that the petitioners in 
those cases were not granted LPR status until they were 
already physically present in the United States.  See 
Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 382; Lanier, 631 F.3d at 1365; 
Martinez, 519 F.3d at 536. 
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Hing Sum, in turn, cites Ayala with approval.8
 
  In 
Ayala, the BIA rejected the petitioner’s argument—identical 
to Martinez’s position here—that the waiver bar did not apply 
to him: 
While the language of section 212(h) 
distinguishes those who have been previously 
admitted for permanent residence from those 
who have not . . . , the statute does not, either 
expressly or by implication, distinguish those 
whose admission was lawful and those were 
who were previously admitted for lawful 
permanent residence but are subsequently 
determined to have been admitted in violation 
of the law.  To read such a distinction into the 
statute would be arbitrary and capricious. 
Ayala, 22 I & N at 401.  Indeed, to find otherwise would be to 
focus on the statutory language of “lawfully admitted” to the 
complete exclusion of “previously been admitted  
. . . as.”  Id.  The Hing Sum court noted that “Ayala’s criminal 
activity at the time of admission did not alter ‘the historical 
fact that, when he entered, it was in the status of a lawful 
permanent resident.’”  Hing Sum, 602 F.3d at 1098 (quoting 
Ayala, 22 I & N at 401).  According to the Ninth Circuit, 
“[t]he same reasoning applies to Sum.”  Hing Sum, 602 F.3d 
at 1098. 
 
We agree and apply that reasoning to Martinez here.  
When the definition of “admitted” is considered in the context 
of the Section 212(h) waiver bar, the statutory imperative to 
define admission in terms of procedural regularity, as 
opposed to substantive satisfaction, is clear.  “[P]reviously 
admitted…as
                                              
8 The First, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have also approved 
of Ayala, albeit in different contexts.  See Onwuamaegbu v. 
Gonzales, 470 F.3d 405, 408-09 (1st Cir. 2006); Savoury v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Obioha v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 400, 409 n.10 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence” must be read as one phrase; to read the “lawfully 
admitted” portion in isolation would render “previously 
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admitted as” superfluous.  “If Congress intended § 212(h) to 
bar only ‘alien[s] lawfully admitted for permanent residence,’ 
there would be no need to describe those non-citizens as also 
‘previously . . . admitted to the United States.’”  Hing Sum, 
602 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Onwuamaegbu v. Gonzales, 470 
F.3d 405, 409 (1st Cir. 2006); citing Romero-Ruiz v. 
Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008)).   
 
Additionally, to adopt Martinez’s proposed substantive 
reading of the statute would fly in the face of Section 212(h)’s 
evident intent.  “By using the term ‘previously admitted,’ 
rather than (for example) ‘previously and lawfully admitted,’ 
Congress demonstrated that it specifically intended to 
penalize those immigrants who sought and gained LPR status 
only to abuse its benefits.”  Onwuamaegbu, 470 F.3d at 409; 
accord Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding rational basis for denying Section 212(h) 
waivers to non-citizens convicted of aggravated felony after 
admission as LPRs; because LPRs “enjoy substantial rights 
and privileges not shared by other aliens,” they should be held 
to a “higher standard and level of responsibility than non-
LPRs”).  Indeed, to conclude otherwise would undermine the 
IIRIRA’s stated purpose.  See Bamba v. Riley, 366 F.3d 195, 
202-03 (3d Cir. 2004) (INA “evince[s] a broad Congressional 
intent to expedite the removal of criminal aliens”); Zhang v. 
I.N.S., 274 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is beyond cavil 
that one of Congress’s principal goals in enacting IIRIRA was 
to expedite the removal of aliens who have been convicted of 
aggravated felonies.”).9
                                              
9 Martinez, for his part, argues that it is our reading of Section 
212(h) that would lead to “perverse results when applied to 
other federal statutes,” such as legislation relating to an 
alien’s eligibility for public benefits such as food stamps or 
supplemental security income.  Brief for Petitioner at 25.  
However, the statutes suggested by Martinez are not part of 
the INA and therefore not administered by the BIA; 
accordingly, the BIA’s construction of Section 212(h)’s 
statutory language is irrelevant as to benefits eligibility.  See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.; 7 U.S.C. §§ 
2013, 2020.   
  Like the Ninth Circuit, we can 
discern “no reason why Congress would give a pass to non-
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citizens who had fraudulently obtained LPR status while 
barring from relief non-citizens who had legitimately 
obtained LPR status.”  Hing Sum, 602 F.3d at 1097 (citation 
omitted); see United States v. Wilson, 503, U.S. 329, 334 
(1992) (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 
(1981) (when interpreting statutes, “absurd results are to be 
avoided”)).10
 
    
IV.     Conclusion 
 
 Section 212(h)’s statutory language, construction, and 
evolution make clear that “admission” and “admitted” refer, 
as in the INA’s definition, to inspection and authorization by 
any immigration officer at the port of entry.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13)(A).  As Martinez was admitted following such 
procedures, after failing to disclose his arrest and subsequent 
conviction for an aggravated felony, the Section 212(h) 
waiver bar applies. For these reasons, we deny the petition for 
review. 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
                                              
10 Despite clearly “absurd results,” other circuits have 
concluded that Congress may have had rational reasons for 
employing statutory language that, in the eyes of those 
circuits, unambiguously excepted aggravated felons convicted 
post-LPR admission from the waiver bar.  See Bracamontes, 
675 F.3d at 388; Martinez, 519 F.3d at 545.  However, as 
discussed above, those circuits considered the import of the 
phrase “previously been admitted” but not in its complete 
modifying context of “previously been admitted…as.”  See 
supra, at 11-12. 
